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[Abstract] 
 
This article assesses the structure and operation of the ICC by setting out a case for 
the defence of the Court, a case for its prosecution and a verdict. Defenders of the 
Court suggest it has had a positive impact because: it has accelerated moves away 
from politics and towards ethics in international relations; it goes a long way towards 
ending impunity; it is a significant improvement on the previous system of ad hoc 
tribunals; it has positive spill-over effects onto domestic criminal systems; and 
because the courage of the Prosecutor and Trial Judges has helped to establish the 
Court as a force to be reckoned with. Opponents of the Court see it as mired in power 
politics, too reliant on the UNSC and on state power to be truly independent; failing to 
bring peace and perhaps even encouraging conflict; and starting to resemble a neo-
colonial project rather than an impartial organ of justice. The verdict on the Court is 
mixed. It has gone some way to ending impunity and it is certainly an improvement 
on the ad hoc tribunals. However it is inevitably a political body rather than a purely 
legal institution, its use as a deterrent is as yet unproven and the expectation that it can 
bring peace as well as justice is unrealistic. 
 
 
[Article] 
 
 
‘In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice. That is the 
simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its realization. We will do our part to see it 
through till the end. We ask you . . . to do yours in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no 
junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will the innocents of 
distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have 
rights, and that those who violate those rights will be punished.’(Annan 1999)  
 
 
Introduction 
 
As I write, three Congolese nationals, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, are being tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
based in the Netherlands.
 1
 They are charged with war crimes involving the enlisting 
and conscripting of children under the age of 15 into the Forces Patriotiques pour la 
Libération du Congo and using them to participate actively in armed hostilities in the 
Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Katanga and Ngudjolo are 
additionally charged with crimes against humanity including sexual slavery, rape and 
murder. An arrest warrant for Lubanga, whose case was the first to be heard by the 
Court, was issued by the ICC in February 2006, and the DRC surrendered him to ICC 
                                                 
1
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custody in the same month. France transported him to The Hague, where judges from 
Bolivia, Costa Rica and the UK are hearing the case against him; a case that has been 
assembled by the Argentinean Prosecutor. Arrest warrants for Katanga and Ngudjolo 
were issued in July 2007, and they were transferred to ICC custody in the Netherlands 
in late 2007 (Katanga) and early 2008 (Ngudjolo). Their trial is being heard by judges 
from France, Belgium and Mali. If convicted, these men will be guilty of breaches of 
a statute that was drafted at a conference of delegates from 160 states, 33 inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) and a coalition of 236 non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in Rome in 1998, and that has now been ratified by 113 states 
(including every country in South America, every member of the European Union and 
31 African states) and signed by a further 26. For all that the Court may or may not be 
able to deliver in terms of universal justice and world peace, its very existence is 
remarkable. It seems to significantly challenge those theories of international relations 
that see states as self-interested units operating in an international anarchy governed 
only by norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention, and where order, regrettably 
perhaps, but inevitably, takes priority over justice.  
 
Yet is this image of the ICC – as a multilateral institution bent only on providing 
justice for the ‘innocents of distant wars’ – a convenient fiction? Is it more accurate to 
understand this institution in a realist frame – as a body that works to discipline weak 
states and to protect the powerful? An institution that the West can use to prosecute 
the rest? Critics of the institution see the ICC as deeply political, and all the worse for 
it. In order to impose some order on the arguments in favour of and opposed to the 
Court, and to draw conclusions about its role in the contemporary international 
system, this article follows the structure (but not the order) of a legal case – with 
arguments presented for the defence of the court, then arguments against it, followed 
by a verdict. When examining arguments in favour of and critical of the ICC, I 
differentiate between those arguments which are focussed on the project of the ICC as 
such (that is, which are concerned with the structure or structural position of the 
Court, or the content of the Rome Statute) and those which are focussed on the 
operation of the Court (the way the Rome Statute is being implemented). In principle, 
structural elements of the ICC would be hard to change but operational elements 
relatively more straightforward to refine, so arguments which find fault with the 
structure should weigh more heavily than those finding fault with process. However, 
as Justice Robert Jackson observed of Nuremberg ‘courts try cases, but cases also try 
courts’ – process can, to some extent at least, influence structure (Jackson 1945). The 
Court has not yet completed a case, and only two cases (Katanga and Ngudjolo are 
being tried in the same case) have reached the trial phase, thus an interim verdict is all 
I attempt below.  
 
The official website of the Rome Statute of the ICC lists the following as reasons for 
the establishment of an international criminal court: to achieve justice for all; to end 
impunity; to help end conflicts; to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals; to take 
over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act; and to 
deter future war criminals.
2
 It is simply too early to establish beyond reasonable doubt 
whether the Court has achieved these goals, though I return to them explicitly in the 
final section and mention them where relevant throughout. For the most part, 
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however, a rather more prosaic standard is used to judge the Court against: does the 
ICC, on balance, have a positive, negative or negligible impact on the international 
system, its constituent states and their inhabitants? 
  
 
The Case for the Defence 
 
The case for the defence of the Court suggests that the ICC has a positive impact. The 
case is based on five claims: three structural and two operational. First, it is claimed 
that the Rome Statute which established the Court is a key document in the 
constitutionalization of international relations (IR) and the process of the 
establishment of the Court has accelerated the move away from power politics in IR 
towards the realisation of common ethical goals. Second, given that there is a growing 
consensus in the international community that atrocities should be punished, the Court 
has significant advantages over ad hoc tribunals in doing so. Third, the Rome Statute 
definitively establishes the individual responsibility of perpetrators for crimes, 
whether or not they are members of a government, whether or not they directly 
committed crimes, and whether or not they were following orders. The Statute, it is 
claimed, ends impunity. The operational claims are first, that the Court and the 
process of its establishment has had positive spill-over effects in supporting domestic 
and hybrid criminal investigations and prosecutions, and second, those who work at 
the Court have shown significant courage in challenging not just those actors who 
flout international law, but also in challenging each other to ensure that the Court 
lives up to the highest standards in its legal practice.  
 
The states, IGOs and NGOs that met in Rome in 1998 managed, against the odds, to 
draw up a statute that distils a clear international criminal code from the disparate 
decisions of past international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the Hague Conventions, Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols. The majority of the decisions made at the 
conference on the drafting of the statute were made by consensus. Although the US 
forced a vote on the statute at the final session of the conference, thus preventing the 
hoped for consensual adoption of the draft, 120 states voted in favour, with 21 
abstaining and only 7 voting against. After the Rome Conference, states quickly 
began to ratify the statute, and it entered into force just four years later, on 1
st
 July 
2002, once 60 ratifications had been deposited. In 2003 the first 18 judges were 
inaugurated, and Luis Moreno Ocampo was appointed as Prosecutor of the Court. 
‘Situations’ (in the vocabulary of the Rome Statute) in Uganda and the DRC were 
referred to the Court in 2004, and situations in the Central African Republic and in the 
Darfur region of Sudan were referred in 2005. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has 
opened investigations in all four of these situations, and cases against specific 
defendants have begun to be compiled. On July 8
th
, 2005, the court issued its first 
arrest warrants, for Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti and three other officers of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda (the warrants were under seal until October 13, 
2005). On 26
th
 January 2009 the trial commenced of the Court’s first case: The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. On 31
st
 March 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
granted the OTP authorisation for the first time to open an investigation proprio motu 
(that is, on his own initiative rather than waiting for the situation to be referred by a 
State Party or the United Nations Security Council  (UNSC)) into the situation of 
crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Kenya 2005-2009. Alongside these 
 4 
investigations, the OTP is currently conducting preliminary analyses of situations in a 
number of countries including Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Colombia and Palestine. 
 
This relatively swift process for the establishment and full operation of such an 
innovative and potentially threatening (to state sovereignty) international institution is 
all the more impressive when one considers the length of time it took for states to 
write a statute to establish an international criminal court.
3
 As far back as 1872, 
Gustav Moynier, one of the founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
called for the creation of a permanent international criminal court. Yet through a 
century in which more than 200 million people died in wars and conflict, many 
murdered by their own governments, little substantive progress was made towards 
establishing a permanent institution to hold to account those responsible for crimes 
against humanity (Leitenberg 2006, 1). Provision was made in Article 227 of the 1919 
Treaty of Versailles for a special international tribunal to try ex-German Emperor 
Kaiser Wilhelm II for ‘a supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties’, thus establishing the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility under international law. The same Article noted that the Allies would 
send ‘a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the 
ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial’. Ironically, the Netherlands, now seat 
of the ICC, refused to extradite the Kaiser so no trial was held.  
 
During the Second World War (WW2), calls were again made for an international 
criminal court, but the Allies instead established ad hoc International Military 
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute individuals for crimes against peace 
(known, at the time, as the crime of crimes), crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
These tribunals represented a move forward in international criminal law to the extent 
that they targeted individuals rather than states or peoples as the agents responsible 
for international crimes, and they rejected the principle of sovereign immunity (i.e. 
the principle that sovereigns are immune from prosecution for acts committed during 
their time in power). But the tribunals were widely criticised for breaching the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) by prosecuting 
defendants for acts which were not defined under international treaty law as crimes at 
the time of their commission and for doling out ‘victor’s justice’. Every judge at the 
Tribunals was a national of one of the victorious allies and alleged allied crimes were 
not investigated. In contrast to (contested – on which more later) claims made about 
the ICC, the Tribunals were as much about international politics as they were about 
international law, as Gerry Simpson explains:   
 
                                                 
3
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As well as trying alleged war criminals, these trials serve as vindication of 
Western progress … they function as moral demarcations between the 
accused and the accuser, they avert attention from war crimes closer to 
home and, finally, they contain the message that the untried crimes are not 
of this magnitude or order. (Simpson 1997, 9) 
 
Post WW2, widespread horror at the extent of losses during the war, and shame at the 
Holocaust having taken place in the heart of the ‘civilised’ world, led to an increase in 
the volume and codification of law concerning state and individual behaviour during 
conflict. The Geneva Conventions were revised and extended, and in 1948 the UN 
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. The General Assembly, in adopting the Convention, also 
requested that the International Law Commission ‘study the desirability and 
possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons 
charged with genocide’4. The Commission reported that the establishment of an 
international court to try crimes of genocide or other crimes against humanity was 
both desirable and possible, and the General Assembly established a Special 
Committee to prepare proposals relating to the establishment of such a court. The 
Committee prepared a draft statute in 1951 and a revised draft statute in 1953, but 
each draft tabled before the General Assembly was rejected due to disagreements over 
the definitions of crimes to be covered. However, by the end of the 1950s, the Cold 
War had led to such deep divisions in UN bodies that work on an international 
criminal court all but ceased. 
 
It took, rather unexpectedly, the drugs trade, and, more predictably, the end of the 
Cold War and the conflicts that followed in the 1990s to reinvigorate the drive 
towards a permanent Court. In June 1989, Trinidad and Tobago were struggling to 
control international drug traffickers operating on their soil and requested the 
International Law Commission to resume work on establishing a permanent 
institution. Support for the idea grew in a wide range of states, in part because the end 
of the Cold War and the supposed triumph of liberalism made an international 
criminal court seem like a viable proposition, and also because, after losing the ability 
to justify foreign policies by claiming them to be necessary in the fight against 
communism, Western democracies began to be publicly concerned with giving their 
policies an ethical dimension
5
. The International Law Commission prepared a draft 
statute of an International Criminal Court (1994) and a draft Code of Crimes (1996), 
but before a court could be established, the UNSC came under such pressure to act 
over the atrocities accompanying the dissolution of Yugoslavia that it created an ad 
hoc criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), in 1993
6
. The genocide in Rwanda prompted the establishment of a second 
tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), in 1994
7
. The 
tribunals were subsidiary organs of the UNSC, and were tasked with ‘prosecuting 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a 
date to be determined by the Security Council (UNSC) upon the restoration of peace’ 
in the case of Yugoslavia and ‘prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other 
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serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994’ in the case of Rwanda8.  These tribunals, while undoubtedly 
innovative, are also territorially and temporally tightly bound in their jurisdiction, as 
well as expensive and slow in carrying out their work. Funds of almost $1.9bn (to end 
2011) have paid for only 89 cases to be concluded at the ICTY since 1993 (with 
proceedings on-going in 15 cases, including those against Radovan Karadzic, 
captured after eluding arrest for 12 years, and Ratko Mladic, still at large). Funds of 
$1.6bn (to end 2011) have paid for 50 cases to be completed at the ICTR since 1994 
(with 24 cases still in progress)
9
.  The tribunals had some significant successes, 
notably in finding Jean Kambanda of Rwanda guilty of genocide – the first time a 
head of government has been convicted of the crime – and in putting Slobodan 
Milosevic on trial for 66 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
Milosevic died in custody in 2006 before a judgment was reached, but his trial 
marked the first time a former head of state had been prosecuted for such grave 
crimes. While the success of courts is not marked by trials and convictions alone, the 
tribunals demonstrated that political leaders are no longer safe from prosecution. 
 
The high cost and slow pace of the tribunals, the high level of media interest in them 
and the brutal nature of the crimes prosecuted by them spurred the international 
community towards finally establishing an ICC. The Court it established was built 
largely on consensus, but not, for the most part, on compromise. Its provisions are far-
reaching (much more so than the most powerful states in the system can currently 
accept, as I discuss below) and the existence of the Court challenges the notion of 
state sovereignty more than any other institution in the contemporary global order. 
The Court is not an organ of the UNSC, and the Council has limited powers over its 
operation – most significantly, the Council cannot veto prosecutions by the Court. The 
Court is not limited to ruling on crimes committed in international conflicts: the Rome 
Statute includes provision for the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes committed in international and internal armed conflict, and also for 
the prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in times of 
peace. Cases can be referred to the Court by States Parties to the Statute and by the 
UNSC, but they can also be instigated by the Prosecutor, who may be petitioned by 
NGOs or other interested parties to open an investigation. The Court can exercise 
jurisdiction in cases instigated by the Prosecutor or referred by States Parties if either 
the state on whose territory the alleged crime was committed, or the state of which the 
accused is a national, is a Party to the Rome Statute. Additionally, if cases are referred 
by the UNSC, as is true of the situation in Darfur, the Court can exercise effective 
universal jurisdiction. Specific state consent to the jurisdiction of the Court (through 
ratifying the Rome Statute or accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court) is not 
required in UNSC referrals, as the Council acts under its competence in Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter in referring cases, and the Charter is binding and legally 
enforceable on all UN member states. In short, the Court has significant actual power 
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 7 
over leaders and nationals of those states that have ratified its founding Statute, and 
significant potential power over leaders and nationals of those states that have not. If 
there is a global constitution emerging in international politics, as an increasing 
number of commentators claim, then the Rome Statute is one of the most important 
elements of it
10
. 
 
As a centralised, permanent institution for investigating and prosecuting war crimes, 
the Court has (or should have) two main structural advantages over ad hoc tribunals: 
cost and efficiency. Cost savings may not be obvious yet due to setup costs and some 
delays in process, but the ICC staff have achieved a great deal since 2002, suggesting 
the structure itself is efficient.
11
 As well as creating a functioning court from scratch, 
including writing administrative and operating procedures, they have consolidated the 
decisions of, and learnings from, prior international criminal tribunals into a single 
body of knowledge. This knowledge is disseminated through databases designed to 
enable those preparing cases for trial at the ICC (and other international or hybrid 
domestic-international criminal tribunals) to access the most up-to-date and 
authoritative text and readings of the substantial number of international criminal law 
statutes, conventions and precedents now in existence. The ICC Legal Tools project 
comprises more than 44,000 documents and legal commentaries and provides legal 
professionals which a (long overdue) complete library on international criminal law
12
. 
The Court’s efficiency is also significantly structurally increased vis-à-vis tribunals 
because it does not have to wait for the UNSC to establish a tribunal in order to begin 
an investigation, so it is neither held up by the slow pace of UNSC decision-making, 
nor is it prevented from investigating situations that the UNSC may not be prepared to 
set up tribunals for, as long as the crimes involved are committed on the territory of, 
or by a national of, a State Party.  
 
The final structural argument for the defence of the Court is the role its Statute plays 
in consolidating the decisions of past tribunals on immunity
13
. The Statute seems to 
go a long way towards ending impunity, one of the key reasons the Court was 
established, and a goal which enjoys broad support. Before the establishment of the 
ICC, political leaders could generally avoid criminal prosecution or even civil suits by 
claiming sovereign immunity (immunity from foreign, and sometimes domestic, legal 
proceedings for acts committed in an official capacity unless the proceedings are 
consensual). Exceptions were the defendants prosecuted at Nuremberg, Tokyo and the 
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ad hoc tribunals, but these represent only a fraction of the political leaders and senior 
functionaries who bear responsibility for atrocity over the last century. Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute makes clear that official capacity is now judged to be irrelevant both 
to criminal responsibility and to mitigation of sentence:  
 
 
‘This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based 
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. … Immunities or special 
procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person.’14  
 
Not only are leaders who order atrocities no longer immune from prosecution nor are 
those who follow their orders. Article 33 of the Statute states that the presumption of 
the Court is in favour of holding the defendant criminally responsible (‘The fact that a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to 
an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not 
relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless …’) then allows for the defence of 
‘Superior Orders’ to be considered in cases where ‘(a) The person was under a legal 
obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question; (b) The 
person did not know that the order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not 
manifestly unlawful’15.  Article 33 states that orders to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity are manifestly unlawful in every case, thus making the defence of 
Superior Orders only possible in cases of war crimes (and, arguably, aggression) and 
even then the onus of responsibility is on the defendant to know the law. Those who 
issue illegal orders but do not directly perpetrate crimes are also covered by the 
Statute. Article 28 establishes that both military and civilian commanders can be 
criminally responsible for acts committed by any subordinates who were or should 
have been under their effective command and control. And many other forms of direct 
and indirect perpetration of crimes are identified by Article 25 (3): a person can be 
responsible for a crime committed with or through another person, a crime she 
attempted, ordered, solicited, induced, facilitated, directly and publicly incited (in 
respect of genocide) or in any other way intentionally contributed to.
16
 
 
Arguments in favour of the Court can also be made in terms of its operational 
features. Trials are underway, investigations are well-progressed and the UNSC, 
States Parties and non-party states alike are referring situations to the Court or 
requesting preliminary examinations to begin. Work towards the Court and its status 
as a permanent and well-resourced institution have also had positive benefits to 
domestic jurisdictions and to other international criminal tribunals. The Bureau of 
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Stocktaking of the Assembly of States Parties noted in March 2010 that:  
 
experience with assistance to national jurisdictions in combating impunity for 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide shows that such assistance 
can have significant and substantial spill-over effects on the entire judicial 
system of the State receiving assistance. Furthermore, international 
cooperation in combating the most serious international crimes can lead to 
cooperation with regard to other forms of transnational criminal activity.
17
  
 
Perhaps the biggest success claimed by the OTP in this respect is Colombia. When 
Ocampo was appointed, he regarded the situations in the DRC and in Colombia as the 
most pressing.
18
 However, Colombia has reacted to ICC pressure (and pressure from 
the US) by establishing the Justice and Peace laws, and has recently claimed 
impressive results: ‘i) around 50,000 demobilized individuals; ii) over 18,000 
weapons given up and destroyed; iii) the main leaders of the self-defense groups and 
their accomplices behind bars awaiting trials; iv) more than 280,000 people 
recognized and registered as victims; v) more than 36,000 criminal actions, previously 
unknown, being investigated.’19 The Colombian government credits the OPT with 
promoting national proceedings by:  
 
‘Facilitating contacts with independent experts…; Publicly denouncing the 
recruitment of child soldiers…; Requesting periodic information about the 
progress in the justice and peace investigations...; Conducting visits to 
Colombia to meet with State officials, judges, prosecutors, NGOs, and 
victims…; Making public the decision to analyze the allegations of 
international networks supporting armed groups committing crimes in 
Colombia.’20  
 
The ICC Review Conference, held in Kampala in June 2010, affirmed its commitment 
to supporting domestic capacity building through a process of ‘positive 
complementarity’:  
 
‘[the Review Conference] [e]ncourages the Court, States Parties and other 
stakeholders, including international organizations and civil society to further 
explore ways in which to enhance the capacity of national jurisdictions to 
investigate and prosecute serious crimes of international concern … and 
[r]equests the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties … to facilitate the 
exchange of information between the Court, States Parties and other 
stakeholders, including international organizations and civil society, aimed at 
strengthening domestic jurisdictions’.21  
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http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8R/ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG.pdf   
18
 Pursuing International Justice: A Conversation with Luis Moreno-Ocampo. Available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21418/pursuing_international_justice.html  
19
 Colombia and the Stocktaking Exercise of the ICC, Colombian official publication. Available at: 
http://colombiaemb.org/docs/Government%20Results/Brochure%20CPI.pdf  
20
 Ibid. The International Center for Transitional Justice is much less optimistic about the domestic 
accountability process in Colombia. See http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Stocktaking/V-M.3.ICTJ_CO_RSRC-Impact.pdf   
21
 RC/Res 1 ‘Complementarity’ http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.1- 
ENG.pdf 
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The ICC has also proved of practical benefit in offering a venue for the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone’s trial of Charles Taylor, a trial judged to be impossible to hold in 
Freetown due to concerns over security and potential political unrest.  
 
Finally, the Prosecutor and judges at the ICC have shown real courage in their initial 
actions. Ocampo has used his office not only to focus world attention on 
contemporary human rights violations by speaking at public events, and to begin 
preliminary examinations of situations in states such as Afghanistan, Georgia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, and Chad, without the States Parties involved having referred themselves to 
the Court. He has also, somewhat sensationally, requested an arrest warrant for 
Sudanese President, Omar al Bashir, on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes in Darfur. His request was granted by the Court in March 2009 (for a 
warrant on the basis of war crimes and crimes against humanity) and in July 2010 (for 
a warrant on the basis of genocide). Bashir, a sitting Head of State, is now a wanted 
man. Whether or not charging Bashir with these crimes was prudent will be touched 
upon below, but it was certainly brave for the first Prosecutor of a new Court to 
pursue a President. 
 
But it is not just those who breach the law who need to beware the Court – those who 
practise it are under scrutiny too. The Trial Judges caused an outcry in June 2008 by 
suspending the first ever ICC trial (of Lubanga) on the basis that a fair trial would not 
be possible as the Prosecutor had not disclosed potentially exculpatory evidence to the 
defence team, then by ordering the release of the defendant (an order which was 
suspended on appeal)
22
. The Judges suspended the case again in July 2010 after the 
Prosecutor refused to identify a key witness, and again ordered the release of Lubanga 
(an order again suspended on appeal). The Trial Chamber lifted the initial stay of 
proceedings in November 2008, but the second is still in place, demonstrating not 
only that the Court has in place internal checks and balances, but also that the judges 
are determined to apply the highest legal standards to the operation of the Court. 
 
The case in defence of the Court therefore rests on robust structural claims about the 
move the Court seems to signal towards more ethical and law-based international 
relations, on the improvements it offers to an ad hoc system and on the provisions in 
the Rome Statute to end impunity. The operational claims are somewhat less far-
reaching, but they do suggest that the early operation of the Court has brought 
positive benefits in the field of complementarity in particular. So, a solid case, one 
might judge, for the defence of the Court. But how does it weigh against the case for 
the prosecution? 
 
 
The Case for the Prosecution 
 
                                                 
22
 The reasoning of the Judges is set out in their Decision on the Consequences of Non-disclosure of 
Exculpatory Materials, available at: http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.PDF, and their 
Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3A01D0E2-39A2-47A9-82EB-
012725EBF91E/277765/ICC010401061418ENG.pdf 
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The case against the Court suggests it either has negligible or negative impact in 
international affairs and on the lives of those it seeks to protect. The case can be 
constructed using two conceptual oppositions that discussions of the Court, and 
international criminal justice in general, are often framed around: law versus power 
politics, and justice versus peace. The Court is supposed to be the missing link in the 
chain of human rights enforcement, aiming to deter atrocity and bring about both 
peace and justice. It will do this, its supporters claim, by rising above the dirty 
business of international politics and by prosecuting any and all individuals guilty of 
the worst atrocities. In this way, it is supposed, the Court will help to end conflict. 
Sceptics of this project suggest that there are structural problems with the Court both 
because it has to find a place for itself alongside powerful political bodies in the 
international system without becoming one itself, and because of the assumption 
made in the pro-global justice discourse that peace and justice are necessarily 
positively linked. Operational criticisms concern the overbearing attitude of the 
current OTP in its dealings with other actors, and the judgments made by the 
Prosecutor over which cases to pursue and the manner in which these are pursued. 
 
International law has long been viewed by liberals as a solution to the deficiencies of 
international politics. Politics, particularly the power politics of sovereign nation-
states, are seen as having a tendency to turn violent, evidenced throughout the 
twentieth century, which leads to the conviction that politics must be controlled by 
law (Kahn 2003; Rivkin & Casey 2003; Rivkin & Casey 2007). There is a romantic 
view, prevalent among UN and NGO advocates of the Court, that the ICC is the 
instantiation of a global moral code – an institution that rises above power politics. 
But the circumstances of its establishment and the first years of its operation have 
shown how bound up the court is with political power and political processes. 
Criticisms of the Court concern the extent to which it is itself a political body and the 
extent to which it is a tool of powerful states. The accusation that the Court is political 
suggests that decisions are taken, particularly by the OTP, that reflect not just legal 
considerations but power- or strategic considerations about which situations or cases 
certain states would like the Court to pursue or refrain from pursuing. It also concerns 
the extent to which the Court is undertaking a political task – disciplining some states 
while insulating others – using the language of law.  
 
The ICC has had to find its place in the international arena alongside political bodies 
reluctant to lose any of their influence – most significantly the UNSC and the US – 
and its relationships to these bodies will do much to determine its future success. The 
Court was not automatically gifted with either authority or legitimacy in the system - 
the Rome Statute was not adopted by the hoped-for consensus in Rome, but after the 
majority of states at the Conference voted in favour of it. That majority did not 
include the US and China (which voted against it), nor India (which abstained). Even 
though more than half of the 191 member states of the UN are now States Parties to 
the statute, the big players in global politics are either absent or actively opposed. The 
three most powerful states with permanent seats on the UNSC, the US, China and 
Russia, have not ratified the treaty, nor have any non-European nuclear powers, nor 
any Middle Eastern states bar Jordan (the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has 
accepted the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court in respect of acts committed on the 
territory of Palestine since July 1
st
 2002, but has not ratified the Rome Statute). The 
Assembly of States Parties is dominated by European, African and Latin American 
states – evidence of widespread support for the Court, but hardly indicative of global 
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consensus which would guarantee both power and legitimacy to the Court. The Court, 
therefore, and seemingly in opposition to its identity as a legal institution, must build 
good working relations with political bodies. 
 
The UNSC, one of the most powerful political institutions in the contemporary 
international system, is charged with the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
23
 As such, it took responsibility, until 2002, for ensuring that (some) 
individuals who committed crimes under international law were brought to justice, 
through the mechanism of ad hoc tribunals. There was much discussion at Rome 
about the role the UNSC should play vis-a-vis the ICC. Non-permanent members of 
the Council did not want the UNSC to be able to interfere with the Court, through fear 
of the international legal process being politicised. But four of the five permanent 
members (P5) – all except the UK – thought the Council should retain significant 
control over the operation of the Court. In the end the majority of states in Rome 
agreed to give the Council the power to defer Court investigations and prosecutions, 
but only by positive vote. This means that the Council is not in a position to approve 
or veto the actions of the Court. Rather, it can defer investigations or prosecutions, but 
only if none of the P5 vetoes such a resolution, and only if the Council is acting 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in deferring, that is, the UNSC must 
determine the existence of a ‘threat to the peace’, a ‘breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of 
aggression’ before it can defer.  
 
The Court may be able to prosecute without UNSC approval, but it needs the Council 
to refer cases to it when atrocities have taken place in which the perpetrators are 
neither nationals of a State Party, nor have committed the acts on the territory of a 
State Party. Counter to the wishes of the ‘Like-Minded Group’ (the most powerful 
caucus in Rome, composed of delegates from more than 60 of the participating states 
and from a well organised coalition of NGOs), who wanted the Court to have inherent 
jurisdiction over the crimes set out in the Statute, the Conference, in a failed attempt 
to gain US support, agreed that the Court should only have inherent jurisdiction over 
the territory and nationals of States Parties. Situations in which the crimes committed 
took place on the territory of a non-party state and were (allegedly) committed by 
nationals of a non-party state must be referred to the Court by the UNSC, unless the 
non-party state has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. The UNSC’s referral power, 
while much less than the P5 wanted, still has significant political implications. 
Because the Court cannot exercise automatic jurisdiction over atrocities, it is 
effectively prevented from prosecuting crimes allegedly committed by nationals of 
non-States Parties who are either members of the P5 or protected by the P5 (unless 
those crimes take place on the territory of a State Party). No binding judgement, for 
example, is likely to be made on Israeli leaders’ seeming contempt for international 
law on proportionality and civilian protection in their attack on the population of Gaza 
in 2008-9 as Israel is not a State Party to the ICC, and the US would veto any 
resolution suggesting that the Council refers the case to the Court. The Court is 
currently considering whether the PNA acceptance of the ad hoc jurisdiction of the 
Court gives it authority to prosecute for crimes committed in the Occupied Territories, 
though it is unlikely to risk the wrath of the US by actually doing so. 
 
                                                 
23
 Article 24:1 of the UN Charter 
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Another power retained by the Council is the power to determine when acts of 
aggression (i.e. the illegal use of force) have taken place (Article 39, UN Charter). 
Aggression, the ‘crime of crimes’ at Nuremberg and Tokyo, was noted as a crime in 
the Rome Statute, but it was not until the ICC Review Conference in Kampala in 2010 
that a definition of the crime was agreed. The key disagreements revolved around 
whether or not charges of aggression could be prosecuted at the Court if the UNSC 
had not made a prior judgment that aggression had taken place. The P5 wanted to 
retain significant power to make such determinations. But proponents of the Court 
argued that decisions over the material facts of a case, especially whether a crime 
being prosecuted has actually taken place, should be made by the Court itself rather 
than by an explicitly political body. In the end, a complicated compromise was 
reached that is unlikely to satisfy either side. A definition of the crime was agreed, 
along with procedures for prosecuting it, but only at the price of giving the P5 
significant protection.
24
 Only nationals of a State Party can be charged with 
aggression, unless the UNSC refers the situation to the Court (referrals, of course, can 
be prevented through use of the veto), and States Parties to the Rome Statute can opt 
out of the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression. If the Prosecutor wishes to investigate 
alleged aggression in the absence of a prior UNSC resolution establishing that 
aggression has taken place, he must notify the Council and wait up to six months for 
such a resolution to be passed before he can proceed. The UNSC can defer 
investigations and prosecutions of aggression in the same way they can defer for other 
crimes. Finally, the new aggression provisions must be passed by the Assembly of 
States Parties by a two-thirds vote no earlier than 1
st
 January 2017, plus 30 States 
Parties must ratify the amendments, before the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression 
becomes active. Van Schaack notes that the concessions made to state consent attest 
to ‘the extreme—if not irrational—antipathy felt by many states toward the Council’ 
(Van Schaak 2010, 8). The problems of aggression and the roles of the ICC and the 
Council in deciding whether it has taken place, have been deferred for now, but could 
have significant political ramifications in the future. A UNSC judgment that 
aggression has taken place gives both the state that has been attacked, and other states 
that wish to assist in repelling the aggressor (i.e. to participate in collective self-
defence), rights under the UN Charter to use military force. An ICC finding of 
aggression could be used to infer such rights and to claim legitimacy for the 
retaliatory use of force. Such a use would be incorrect, as only the UNSC can 
authorise force, but such rhetoric could nevertheless be influential given the moral 
authority many claim for the ICC. 
 
The Review Conference may have succeeded in limiting UNSC power in the Court 
(though only by increasing state power), but there is another problem likely to emerge 
if and when the OTP can prosecute aggression. Fear of prosecution for aggression will 
make force more politically difficult to use to resolve disputes. While this may, in 
general, be a good thing, such an outcome would also have victims, as the US among 
others would be reluctant to answer calls to intervene in crisis situations such as in 
Kosovo. The ICTY was in place when the atrocities in Kosovo began and does not 
seem to have had any deterrent effect. Thus we need to be sure that justice is better 
served by attempting to prosecute those who commit atrocities rather than trying to 
                                                 
24RC/Res 6 ‘The Crime of Aggression’ http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-
ENG.pdf  
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stop them doing so via the use of force.
25
 The structures of power in international 
relations and the constraints upon it are undoubtedly being influenced by the Court, 
but it is not clear that the influence is either substantial, or positive. The UNSC is still 
in a position to be able to frustrate the operation of the Court if it wishes to do so, but 
it has much less leeway than the permanent members of the Council desire. 
 
In order to be effective, the Court needs not just the support of the UNSC, but also the 
support of States Parties and non-party states. Unfortunately, this need for state 
support threatens the Court’s independence. The operation of international criminal 
justice has long relied on the ideological and material support of states – for instance, 
the US made the offer of a significant economic aid package to Serbia conditional 
upon the extradition of Milosevic to the ICTY – and there is no reason to think it will 
not do so long into the future. The ICTY relied on SFOR (the NATO-led 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia) to protect its investigators and enforce its decisions, 
and the ICTR relied on the ruling Rwandan Bizimungu/ Kagame regime. The ICC has 
no standing military or police force and relies entirely on goodwill and international 
co-operation. States must arrest suspects, protect the Court’s investigators and enforce 
its decisions. There is, therefore, a structural problem in that the court is incentivised 
to treat those states upon who it relies most heavily with undue lenience or favour. 
Sceptics argue that it is no coincidence that NATO and RPF members have escaped 
prosecution at the ICTY and ICTR respectively – without funding and logistical 
support from the NATO states in the case of Yugoslavia the ICTY would have 
foundered. Without cooperation from the Rwandan government over issues such as 
access and visas for witnesses, the ICTR would have been rendered incapable. With 
regards to the ICC, while the Court does not rely on any particular state or group as 
heavily as the Tribunals did, it still is too reliant on US approval or at least 
acquiescence to be truly neutral. If the US supports the Court, then Sudanese or 
Ugandan intransigence or opposition (see below) can be overcome. It should be no 
surprise, therefore, that the Court has done little so far that is counter to US interests, 
even while the US (under the first Bush administration) was undermining the Court at 
every opportunity.  
 
The Bush administration’s attitude to much international law is well-known (though 
often caricatured). Bush didn’t quietly oppose or ignore the ICC in the way that India 
and China tend to. Rather, he ‘unsigned’ the Rome Statute, cajoled an estimated 102 
states (including many State Parties) into signing ‘bilateral immunity agreements’ 
which protect US citizens and officials from the Court and forced through UNSC 
Resolution 1422 which guaranteed that non-party states contributing to peacekeeping 
missions were immune from the Court. His stance eventually softened and the US 
abstained in order for the UNSC to refer the situation in Sudan to the Court in 2005, 
but the US under Bush both feared and resisted the independence of the Court. 
Despite widespread excitement at the replacement of Bush with Obama and some 
promising rhetoric, there are few concrete signs that the new administration will look 
significantly more favourably upon the court than the Bush administration did in its 
later years. But of much greater concern, the structural position of the US as not just 
any hegemon but a liberal hegemon that can take much of the credit for the spread of 
                                                 
25
 See Rudolph (2001) for a discussion of whether prosecuting international crimes is a way that states 
can be seen to be ‘doing something’ in the face of human rights abuse, without having to pay the 
domestic costs of preventing abuse or atrocity using military force. See Simpson (2008) on the 
difficulties and inadvisability of making war a crime.  
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international justice since 1945 means the Court is not taking the kind of action 
against the behaviour of the US and its allies in the War on Terror that critics believe 
it should. 
 
The Obama administration’s rhetoric has been relatively positive towards the Court, 
but only when the Court is seen to act in US interests, fundamentally defined in terms 
of national security. Obama has stated that  
 
‘[t]he court has pursued charges only in cases of the most serious and 
systematic crimes and it is in America’s interests that these most heinous of 
criminals, like the perpetrators of the genocide in Darfur, are held accountable. 
These actions are a credit to the cause of justice and deserve full American 
support and cooperation.’ 26  
 
This view has led to a commitment that the US should cooperate with the Court, but 
only ‘in a way that reflects American sovereignty and promotes our national security 
interests.’27 In response to written questions by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in January 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that 
“we will end hostility towards the ICC, and look for opportunities to encourage 
effective ICC action in ways that promote US interests by bringing war criminals to 
justice”. In March 2010, in the most detailed statement yet on the Obama 
administration’s position, Harold Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, 
announced a policy of ‘principled engagement with the Court’ and offered US 
cooperation with the Court in those prosecutions that are already underway (Koh 
2010). At a Press Conference after the ICC Review Conference in 2010, at which the 
US had ‘observer’ status, Stephen Rapp, US Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes 
Issues, confirmed that the US was offering assistance such as ‘information sharing…., 
witness protection and diplomatic support, and support and efforts to arrest suspects’ 
to the ICC, but only where the ICC ‘is pursuing the same kind of cases that we 
prosecuted through … international institutions in Rwanda and Sierra Leone’ (Rapp 
2010).  
 
This may sound positive, but Obama’s position is not necessarily an improvement on 
his predecessor’s. Bush eventually realised that the Court could work in US interests, 
and therefore allowed the situation in Darfur to be referred to it, subsequently 
declaring that the US would veto any UNSC resolution requiring the ICC to defer the 
case once the arrest warrant for Bashir had been issued. The Obama administration is 
also prepared to assist the ICC in prosecuting others, but is still a long way from 
allowing the Court jurisdiction over US territory or nationals. The President may have 
changed, but the US has not, and a seismic shift leading to US ratification of the 
Rome Statute is unlikely given the US belief in the ultimate authority of its own 
Constitution and traditional US reluctance to be bound by international law. 
28
 The 
hopes of many Democrats that Obama would seek domestic or international 
prosecution for those who allegedly committed war crimes under the last 
administration have been dashed and the new administration has expanded the policy 
of using unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to carry out what look like extra-judicial 
                                                 
26
 Quoted from report available at 
http://www.globalsolutions.org/in_the_news/analysis_obama_vs_mccain_icc 
27
 Ibid 
28
 See Kahn (2003) and Ralph (2007) for further discussion of the US position on the Court. 
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executions in the War on Terror.
29
 The ICC is in the invidious position of coveting 
support from a state that largely rejects the authority of international humanitarian and 
criminal law with respect to its own actions. The reluctance of the Court to open 
investigations in cases involving US allies such as Colombia and Israel, and even 
more so the US itself,  leads to the Court effectively ‘avert[ing] attention from war 
crimes [of the powerful]’, to return to the quote used earlier about Nuremberg 
(Simpson 1997, 9). Mamdani has argued that the Court has already lost any veneer of 
impartiality:  
 
‘[t]he fact of mutual accommodation between the world’s only superpower 
and an international institution struggling to find its feet on the ground is clear 
if we take into account the four countries where the ICC has launched its 
investigations: Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Congo. All are 
places where the United States has no major objection to the course chartered 
by ICC investigations. Its name notwithstanding, the ICC is rapidly turning 
into a Western court to try African crimes against humanity. It has targeted 
governments that are U.S. adversaries and ignored actions the United States 
doesn’t oppose, like those of Uganda and Rwanda in eastern Congo, 
effectively conferring impunity on them.’ (Mamdani 2008) 
 
There are structural barriers to the Court acting as an independent, non-political but 
still impactful institution. But there are also operational criticisms of the way the court 
staff, in particular the OTP, has responded to its role. In its initial investigations, the 
OTP has been perceived by its partners and the Trial Chamber as arrogant and 
difficult: Phil Clark reports that the ICC has behaved not as one institution working 
alongside others to achieve the common goals of peace and justice in the DRC, but as 
‘the lead organisation to which all others are answerable’ (Clark 2008a). Clark’s 
research shows that the Court irritated MONUC (the UN peacekeeping mission in the 
DRC) and the Congolese army to such an extent, in refusing to acknowledge their 
assistance in gathering evidence and arresting suspects, that MONUC has been 
reluctant to work with the ICC to arrest the LRA leaders based in north-east Congo. 
His work also suggests that the breakdown of relations between MONUC and the ICC 
is the main reason that the UN initially refused to let the defence team see evidence it 
had gathered against Lubanga, leading to the near collapse of the trial. Clark 
concludes that ‘the Court has generally failed to foster meaningful relations with UN 
peacekeeping missions and other ground-level institutions that are vital to its cause’ 
(Clark 2008a). There is no structural reason for this failure, and in fact UN bodies 
should be well-disposed towards the Court: the animosity that now exists was entirely 
avoidable.  
 
Through hard negotiation and majority votes, states as a group have afforded the 
Court significantly more power than commentators expected, given the slow process 
                                                 
29
 Koh (2010) defends such strikes as legal. For analysis and critique of the position he set out, and 
discussion of US use of targeted killing in general, see http://www.crimesofwar.org/news-
obama2.html; http://opiniojuris.org/2010/04/14/the-koh-speech-and-targeting-an-american-citizen/; 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/03/kens-not-yet-response-re-drone-warfare-and-targeted-killing-and-
professor-alstons-report/; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/02/AR2010090204463.html. The careful but critical position of Philip 
Alston, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, is available 
here: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/137/53/PDF/G1013753.pdf?OpenElement. 
See paragraphs 85-6 in particular.   
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of reaching consensus on a Statute to create the Court. However they have not 
established it as a truly independent institution. The Court is too much reliant on the 
UNSC, in particular the P5, making the probability of prosecution at the ICC of 
crimes alleged to have been committed by some of the most powerful actors in the 
system almost nil. The situation is made even worse by the growing belief among a 
range of state and non-state actors that the Court is worse than ineffectual – it is 
actually threatening to peace. 
 
The ICC was established in part because it was believed that a permanent 
international court would help to end conflict. Peace and justice tend to be assumed in 
pro-ICC discourse to be complementary: ‘few topics are of greater importance than 
the fight against impunity and the struggle for peace and justice and human rights in 
conflict situations in today's world.’30 But it is the seeming opposition of peace and 
justice that is receiving most attention from analysts of international criminal law at 
present. The ICC has issued arrest warrants for a sitting President, Bashir of Sudan, at 
a time when not one but two delicate peace processes were under threat (in the South 
and in Darfur), and the initial Sudanese response to the warrant seems to confirm 
fears that pursuing justice in the region will be at the expense of peace. After the first 
warrant was issued on 4
th
 March 2009, 13 international aid agencies, including 
Oxfam, Save the Children and Medecins Sans Frontieres, were expelled from the 
Darfur region. Peacekeepers have been attacked, an aid worker has been killed and at 
least 13 aid workers have been kidnapped since March 2009.
31
 Ocampo’s request for 
a warrant, and the agreement to this request by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, 
have drawn widespread criticism from within Sudan, from other African and Arab 
states, and even from UN representatives. In November 2008, Assistant Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet told the Security Council that Ocampo’s 
attempts to charge Bashir could potentially derail the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in South Sudan, and lead to serious security threats to UN peacekeepers in 
Darfur. Many UN members have indicated support for suspending ICC action if 
Bashir co-operates in bringing peace to Darfur – they assume that peace will not be 
possible if justice is done. The Arab League and the African Union called at the time 
of the first warrant for the UN Security Council to use its powers, under Article 16 of 
the ICC constitution, to suspend the case against Bashir and Security Council 
members Burkina Faso, China, Libya, Russia, Uganda and Vietnam were believed to 
support the plan.
32
 China has been particularly outspoken about the charges against 
Bashir, stressing that justice threatens peace, and that peace should be prioritised. A 
statement from the Foreign Ministry in March 2009 stated that ‘China expresses its 
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 http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm 
31
 It is not clear whether the government of Sudan is directly involved in these actions, whether they are 
the responsibility of groups sympathetic to Bashir or, in the case of kidnappings, the responsibility of 
groups seeking to earn money through ransom demands. It is clear that the surge in kidnappings and 
attacks on aid workers came soon after the first arrest warrant for Bashir was issued, with five members 
of Medecins Sans Frontiers kidnapped on March 11
th
 2009. Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ali 
Youseff is reported to have commented: ‘[a]nything that goes wrong [since the warrant] onwards I 
personally attribute to the ICC decision.’ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/12/darfur-doctors-
without-bo_n_174206.html  
32
 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30165. NB There is currently no mechanism in the 
Rome Statute for the warrants to be withdrawn. Article 53 makes clear that the OTP can decide not to 
pursue an investigation or prosecution if it is judged not to be in the interests of justice to do so, but 
there is no procedure for actors external to the OTP to force the withdrawal of arrest warrants already 
issued. 
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regretfulness and worry over the arrest warrant for the Sudan president issued by the 
International Criminal Court. China is opposed to any action that could interfere with 
the peaceful situation in Darfur and Sudan. At the moment, the primary task of the 
international community is to preserve stability in the Darfur region.’33 The US 
published a ‘Sudan Strategy’ in October 2009 that affirmed US support for 
‘international efforts to bring those responsible for genocide and war crimes in Darfur 
to justice’ but emphasized the importance of ‘locally-owned accountability and 
reconciliation mechanisms that can make peace more sustainable’ and made no 
mention of whether it supported the ICC in its case against Bashir. It also offered 
‘incentives’ if the Bashir government ‘acts to improve the situation on the ground and 
to advance peace’.34 Analysts suggest that the strategy gives the US significant 
‘wiggle room’ to do a deal with Bashir to try to get the warrants withdrawn if Bashir 
cooperates to bring peace.
35
 
 
There is much irony in this situation – the UNSC referred the case to the ICC in the 
first place as Sudan is not a Party to the Rome Statute, so the Court would have had 
no jurisdiction without the UNSC granting it. But it is also unclear whether the 
attempt at justice in investigating the situation in Darfur and issuing arrest warrants 
for high level government figures (on 2
nd
 May 2007 arrest warrants were issued for 
Sudanese humanitarian affairs minister Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Janjaweed 
militia leader Ali Kushayb) contributed to bringing about the ceasefire the Sudanese 
Government announced in November 2008. There is strong feeling that the ceasefire 
was called by the Sudanese government in an attempt to persuade the UNSC to 
suspend the ICC investigation. Payam Akhavan (2009) has argued that ICC 
involvement pressured the government to distance itself from atrocities committed by 
its proxy fighters the Janjaweed, which has led to many Janjaweed defecting from the 
government, thus increasing the likelihood of peace in the region. Clark (2009), in 
response, argued that ICC involvement just changed the way the Sudanese 
government carried out violence, attacking civilians more often itself now instead of 
through the Janjaweed. The position of African states is also unclear: the African 
Union has split over its opposition to the ICC, with State Parties such as Uganda, 
South Africa and Botswana claiming that they would arrest Bashir if he was found on 
their territory.
 
In addition, the High Level Panel led by Thabo Mbeki, tasked by the 
AU in mid 2009 to find a way to resolve the conflict in Darfur, did not condemn the 
ICC warrant and recommended a hybrid court and changes to Sudanese laws to 
enable the accused (potentially including Bashir) to be tried. Peace is seen in the panel 
report as dependent on justice. However, Chad had also claimed that it would arrest 
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 Quoted from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/4940876/China-calls-for-
ICC-case-against-Sudan-president-Omar-al-Bashir-to-be-dropped.html 
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 Sudan Strategy available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm  
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 See, for instance: http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10/19/the-obama-strategy-on-sudan-how-to-downplay-
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instance Obama’s response to Bashir’s visit to Kenya in August 2010 was a clear rebuke to Kenya for 
not arresting him: ‘I am disappointed that Kenya hosted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in defiance 
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reflects a split in the administration as to the correct policy. See 
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Bashir if he was found on its territory, but in July 2010, Bashir attended a meeting of 
regional leaders in Chad. It was his first visit to the territory of an ICC State Party 
since the first warrant for his arrest was issued in March 2009. He subsequently 
visited Kenya, another State Party, to attend the ceremony of the signing of Kenya’s 
new constitution. Neither state made any attempt to arrest him. The AU justified the 
actions of Chad and Kenya as follows: ‘both Chad and Kenya, being neighbours of 
Sudan, have an abiding interest in ensuring peace and stability in Sudan and in 
promoting peace, justice and reconciliation which can only be achieved through 
continuous engagement with the elected government of Sudan.’36 There is no 
agreement on what the effect of the ICC in Sudan has been, and with killing in Darfur 
continuing, the stakes are very high if we subsequently find out that peace, in this 
instance, is threatened by attempts to bring justice. 
 
The dilemma of how to respond to claims that justice is an obstacle to peace is also 
faced by the ICC over the situation in Uganda. President Museveni referred the 
situation in Northern Uganda to the Court in 2003, reportedly after lobbying from 
Ocampo (Clark 2008b, 43). The ICC was quick to take up the case, issued arrest 
warrants for five of the commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity and claimed the Court could help to end the 20-year 
conflict in six months (Apps 2005, cited in Clark & Waddell 2008, 45). However, 
none of the suspects have been arrested to date, and, in 2008, when movement was 
finally made towards peace talks in the region, the involvement of the ICC seemed to 
derail the process. Museveni refused to execute arrest warrants for LRA commanders, 
and instead worked, with UN support, to negotiate a ceasefire with the group. 
However, Joseph Kony, head of the LRA and therefore a key figure in making sure 
that any peace deal is carried through, refused to sign an agreement in November 
2008 unless the ICC lifted the outstanding arrest warrants for LRA leaders. As with 
the situation in Sudan, the OTP has taken the position that it is an organ of justice: it 
has found good reasons to think that serious breaches of international law have taken 
place, and it is therefore intending to go ahead with prosecutions.
37
 The Court has 
reminded all States Parties, which includes Uganda, that they have a duty to arrest any 
person that the Court has issued a warrant against. However, the Court has also toned 
down its rhetoric, claiming not that it can help end the conflict, but that justice is 
necessary to punish the LRA leaders for their crimes and to undermine Uganda’s 
culture of impunity. 
 
As in Sudan, it is far from clear whether the Court is having a positive, negative or 
negligible effect on peace efforts in Uganda. Some commentators are convinced it is 
negative, others are less certain.
38
 Again, justice and peace may have been positively 
linked when the Court first began investigating the situation: the initial ICC referral 
and the fear of prosecution seem to have been instrumental in bringing the LRA to the 
negotiating table in the first place, and the ICC’s investigation seems to have 
restricted the flows of arms and resources to the LRA from Khartoum (O’Brien 2007). 
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Additionally, in an attempt to get the ICC to withdraw, a special division of the 
Uganda High Court has been set up to try those charged by the ICC – a significant 
about-turn as Museveni proposed amnesties for the LRA leaders as recently as 2006.
39
 
The proposed solution is still somewhat lacking - soldiers from the Ugandan armed 
forces, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), accused of atrocities during 
fighting in the north will not stand trial, but it is more than could have been expected 
without ICC involvement. However, critics argue that the effects of the Court are 
more insidious, for instance Clark (2009) notes that ICC involvement has displaced 
LRA violence to north-eastern DRC. The Court has also been accused of prolonging 
conflict in Northern Uganda by issuing warrants only for LRA leaders and ignoring 
atrocities committed by UPDF personnel, thus lending legitimacy to violence by 
government forces in the region rather than deterring it (Clark 2009).   
 
The Court, again, is in an invidious position. It was assumed by many ICC supporters 
that peace would follow as a natural consequence of justice, particularly once a 
permanent Court had been established. In fact, in two of the situations the ICC is 
involved in, its involvement may be preventing peace. It is not clear what the effect 
on the credibility of the ICC would be if it had to suspend or even abandon its 
investigations in Sudan and Uganda in order to enable peace deals, given that part of 
the rationale for prosecutions is to help bring about peace. It may be that the Rome 
Statute needs to be revised to force the Prosecutor to take the interests of peace into 
account as well as the interests of justice when deciding which situations and cases to 
pursue. However, doing this would both bring the Court into further conflict with the 
UNSC, and would make it a much more obviously political institution than it is at 
present. The perceived shift of the Court away from being an impartial legal body 
towards the machinations of power politics is already too pronounced for some 
commentators: ‘African states were keen supporters of the Court in the early years. 
Now, they seem to be turning against the Court. This is not a good development. At 
the same time, the United States is warming up to the Court. Personally, I like the 
court better when it had the support of African States and was disliked by the US.’40 
The structural arguments against the court, supplemented by criticism of the early 
actions of the OTP, constitute a strong case for the Prosecution. 
 
 
The Verdict 
 
Tempted as I am to argue that the jury is still out, it is possible to draw tentative 
conclusions about the Court and the first decade of its operation. The ICC is, in 
structural terms, a tremendous achievement, with significant potential to permanently 
alter the vocabulary and processes of international politics. States have created a 
Court with more insulation from political power than was expected, given that the 
UNSC cannot veto prosecutions and the Prosecutor can initiate investigations proprio 
motu. The Court is also exerting its authority in the international realm (too much so 
according to its critics), by refusing to bow to pressure to suspend the pursuit of 
justice for the cause of peace. However, the effects of the Court on the situations it is 
investigating, and the effects of the international power political structure on the 
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Court, are cause for concern. The charges against Bashir have only fuelled the view 
that the ICC is a neo-colonial project in which Westerners prosecute Africans. 
Ocampo is examining a variety of non-African situations, and a non-African 
investigation and cases would certainly help the Court to appear more global in its 
reach.
41
 But any investigation that the Court pursues is likely to be mired in the same 
kinds of difficulties faced in Uganda and Sudan. The ICC can only prosecute crimes 
committed after the Rome Statute came into force in July 2002, so its early cases are 
often going to be situations in which conflict is still ongoing, or only recently ceased, 
and as such the Court will necessarily be mired in further controversy.  
 
It is worth reflecting on the reasons (listed in the Introduction) given for the 
establishment of the Court. Some of the more straightforward reasons to establish 
such a Court have been vindicated. The Court is able to remedy at least some of the 
deficiencies of the ad hoc tribunals. Structurally, the Court is a significant 
improvement because of its permanence. No longer is international justice directly at 
the mercy of the UNSC, which may or may not decide to set up ad hoc tribunals in 
particular cases. The Court has, in theory and under strict conditions, jurisdiction over 
any atrocity committed anywhere in the world. Operationally, as the initial set-up 
costs decrease, the Court should become both cheaper and more efficient than the 
Tribunals. The Court has also shown itself able to take over when national criminal 
justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act, most clearly in the case of Kenya. 
But there are few signs that the Court is attempting to procure cases – the policy of 
‘positive complementarity’, or enhancing domestic justice systems to mitigate the 
need for an ICC, enjoys broad support. It is also the case that this policy can be 
abused if used to avoid opening ICC investigations into situations which would prove 
unpopular with the US and its allies, such as Colombia and Israel.  
 
The more utopian reasons to establish an ICC are not so obviously upheld. The Court 
is not achieving justice for all, nor is it likely to. It does, however, have the potential 
to achieve justice for more. This justice, delivered according to a Statute which has 
been ratified by 113 states and in a permanent and publically accessible institution 
presided over by judges who seem keen to hold the various organs of the Court to 
high standards, should be better justice than has been possible in the past. Similarly, 
impunity is significantly reduced by the wording of the Rome Statute and the 
rejection of the idea that public office brings immunity is undoubtedly a positive step. 
However, if State Parties to the Court continue to entertain instead of arrest a man 
charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the message sent is 
that being a President makes you untouchable. Equally, if states such as the US, China 
and India stay outside the Rome Statute system, it will appear that impunity can be 
bought with power. 
 
The Court is also claimed to deter future war criminals. There is some anecdotal 
evidence that making commanders criminally responsible for the acts of their 
subordinates deters atrocity (Akhavan 2001; Wippman 1999). But deterrence is much 
less likely when committing Rome Statute crimes does not always lead to being 
charged by the Court and when being charged does not lead swiftly to arrest and trial. 
If there is little likelihood of political leaders facing trial, there is little likelihood of 
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them being deterred from employing illegal violence in pursuit of their interests in the 
future. Thus, instead of helping to end conflicts, the Court may have little or no effect 
on them. Most concerning of all, ICC involvement in situations such as Darfur and 
Northern Uganda may actually prolong conflict.   
 
The verdict on the ICC is therefore mixed, and the most important conclusion to draw 
from the foregoing analysis is the impossibility (yet) of knowing whether the Court is 
either an unambiguously positive or an obviously negative addition to international 
relations. It is neither an apolitical expression of global moral consensus, staffed by 
saints, nor a court of victors’ justice controlled by the US to work in the interests of 
hegemony. The Court has significant power over, and independence from, states and 
state-actors such as the UNSC. Yet they still have more influence on the Court than 
ICC supporters would wish. And the power of the Court translates, inevitably, into 
political power. The Court is a political institution that does its business using the 
language of law; a project of ‘legalistic politics’ in which politics and law are 
inevitably intertwined, because ‘[u]ltimately, war crimes trials pursue political ends 
through jurisprudential means’ (Simpson 2007 23-24). Those ends may be admirable, 
for instance, the Court may work to prevent those with political power from abusing it 
and attacking their own citizens or the citizens of other states. The ends may be 
regrettable, for instance the Court may discipline weak states and bolster strong ones. 
But they are always and inevitably political. And the political power of state actors 
will always and inevitably impact upon the Court: it is one institution among many in 
the contemporary international system, and as such must interact with and sometimes 
defer to others. The particular contribution of the Court is not that it is apolitical, but 
that it uses the structures, language and methods of law to change the way that politics 
is practised.  
 
Equally, the Court has great potential to do good through reducing impunity and 
increasing the spread of criminal justice. But it is not the solution (it may not even be 
a solution) to the problem of ending atrocity. There is reason now to stop judging the 
Court on whether it works in the interests of peace, and task it only with achieving 
justice. The Court is not well-suited to the role of peacemaker – it is not a tool of 
diplomacy and compromise. States, the UNSC and other UN bodies are far better 
placed to work towards peace. If justice is a worthy goal, it must be pursued on its 
own terms rather than with the utopian justification that trials can end wars. Few 
believed an international criminal court possible until just over a decade ago. It is 
important now to temper both the optimism and the cynicism surrounding the 
institution and frame the debate around what there is evidence to suggest such a Court 
can achieve. The potential of the Court to make better justice available to more people 
is reason enough, for now, to support it. 
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